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NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAWS: UTILITARIANISM FOR DINNER, 
DESERT FOR DESSERT 
William C. Shubeck* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine your favorite dish; think of its ingredients.  Consider how 
each ingredient has a unique role, all in the name of the finished product.  
Next, consider the consequences of adjusting the quantity of each 
ingredient.  Adding an extra pinch of salt may not do much, but what if 
the adjustment is to triple the red pepper flakes?  The right combination 
of ingredients creates a hybrid of culinary cornerstones such as salt, fat, 
and acid, but the dish’s ultimate success hinges on one thing: balance.  
Throwing your dish out of balance could lead to an inedible product, and 
an insatiable hunger could impact areas well outside your kitchen.  The 
criminal justice system is like a successful dish: competing ingredients 
are combined to pursue a balanced product.  The main difference from 
eating your favorite dish, however, is that over two million people are 
seated at this table.  As of 2019, “[t]he American criminal justice system 
holds almost 2.3 million people in 1,719 state prisons, 109 federal 
prisons, 1,772 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,163 local jails, and 80 
Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons, immigration detention 
facilities, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and 
prisons in the U.S.”1  In New Jersey alone, there are 19,212 individuals 
incarcerated in the prison system.2  Of those 19,212 incarcerated 
individuals, 14,660 are incarcerated under mandatory minimum 
sentences.3  This mandatory minimum sentencing in New Jersey is 
implemented, in part, by a specific piece of criminal legislation: the New 
Jersey No Early Release Act (“NERA”). 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., The University of 
Scranton.  The author would like to thank his advisor, Professor Brian Murray, as his 
thoughtful guidance and reassurance made this Comment possible. 
 1 Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2020). 
 2 Offender Statistics, STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, https://www.state.
nj.us/corrections/pdf/offender_statistics/2019/Entire%20Report%20-%20Offender
%20Characteristics%20Report.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2020). 
 3 Id. 
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This Comment will dive into various stages of the New Jersey 
criminal justice system, with a focus on the theoretical justifications for 
punishment.  Part II will provide an in-depth review of the common 
justifications for punishment.  Part III will examine specific aspects of 
the New Jersey criminal justice system and illustrate how these aspects 
evince a hybrid scheme with distinct retributivist qualities, though still 
skews toward the utilitarian end of the spectrum.  Part IV will discuss 
NERA’s framework and impact in New Jersey.  This Comment argues 
that NERA’s potentially overly retributive structure creates an 
inconsistency in the New Jersey criminal justice system.  This 
inconsistency arises because other key areas of the system (such as 
parole and expungement) create a hybrid scheme that considers 
culpability and blameworthiness while still emphasizing rehabilitative 
goals that increase public safety.  Thus, the overarching conclusion is 
that NERA’s lack of utilitarian values may hinder the overall 
maximization of public safety in New Jersey.  Accordingly, Part V will 
note potential changes to NERA, and Part VI will conclude. 
Before the discussion proceeds, however, it should be noted that 
analysis of any area of criminal law is a sensitive process.  Assessing 
whether punishment practices are efficient and acceptable does not 
make light of crime or provide offenders with any special treatment.  
Rather, taking a step back and assessing how a system approaches 
punishment may lead to a more productive equal justice system.  Judge 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit has noted: 
[W]e should have a realistic conception of the composition of 
the prison and jail population before deciding that they are a 
scum entitled to nothing better than what a vengeful populace 
and a resource-starved penal system choose to give them.  We 
must not exaggerate the distance between “us,” the lawful 
ones, the respectable ones, and the prison and jail population; 
for such exaggeration will make it too easy for us to deny that 
population the rudiments of humane consideration.4 
II.  PUNISHMENT THEORY 
Punishment theory uses moral and societal considerations to 
justify the imposition of punishments, such as imprisonment.  The 
primary justifications of punishment under this theory are retributivism 
and utilitarianism.5  Briefly stated, retributivist justifications are that (1) 
 
 4 Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
 5 It should be noted here that both justifications contain sub-approaches, meaning 
that painting either justification with a broad brush is not advised.  This discussion will 
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punishment is justified because people deserve it; and (2) the purpose 
of punishment is to give an offender what he deserves (hence the phrase 
“just deserts”).6  Under the utilitarian approach, also referred to as 
“consequentialist,” or “instrumentalist,” punishment is justified by the 
useful purposes that it serves.7  These justifications, along with their 
strengths and weaknesses, will be explained further below. 
A.  What is Punishment? 
Though one can easily identify incarceration as punishment, other 
side effects of incarceration (such as a lasting criminal record after 
release) may also be punishment.8  A prominent commentator on 
aspects of punishment, Kent Greenawalt, simplified the notion of 
punishment into six features: 
First, “[punishment] is performed by, and directed at, agents 
who are responsible in some sense.  God and humans can 
punish; hurricanes cannot.  People, but not faulty television 
sets, are fit subjects of punishment.”  Second, it involves 
“designedly” harmful or unpleasant consequences.  Third, the 
unpleasant consequences usually are “preceded by a judgment 
of condemnation; the subject of punishment is explicitly 
blamed for committing a wrong.”  Fourth, it is imposed by one 
who has authority to do so.  Fifth, it is imposed for a breach of 
some established rule of behavior.  Finally, it is imposed on an 
actual or supposed violator of the rule of behavior.9 
This framework, however, only shows us whether something is or is not 
punishment.  Exhibiting these features—thus being labeled as 
“punishment”—is not a sufficient condition for justification; rather, it is 
a necessary one. 
B.  Utilitarian Justification of Punishment 
One important aspect of the utilitarian justification of punishment 
is the desire for a net societal benefit: “[u]pon the principle of utility, if 
[punishment] ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in 
 
not delve into these sub-approaches, and to avoid mislabeling, the discussion will keep 
things to a birds-eye view of retributivism and utilitarianism. 
 6 KENT GREENAWALT, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282, 1284 (Joshua Dressler 
ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
 7 Id. 
 8 The conclusion that things such as a criminal record are automatically 
“punishment” is not universally accepted, and it is the source of many philosophical 
discussions in the criminal law sphere.  Such discussions do not fall within the ambit of 
this Comment, though. 
 9 JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (7th ed. 
2015) (quoting GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1282–83). 
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as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”10  Thus, the utilitarian 
goal of this net societal benefit is sought via seven means, described 
below. 
1.  General Deterrence   
Simply put, if people know they will be punished for an act, and 
they assess that the punishment outweighs the perceived benefit of that 
act, they will avoid doing it.11  General deterrence is not thwarted just 
because people commit the act that is sought to be curtailed.12  Out of all 
seven of the utilitarian means, however, it is general deterrence that 
seems to value the severity of punishment the most according to 
Greenawalt: 
With a properly developed penal code, the benefits to be 
gained from criminal activity would be outweighed by the 
harms of punishment, even when those harms were 
discounted by the probability of avoiding detection.  
Accordingly, the greater the temptation to commit a particular 
crime and the smaller the chance of detection, the more severe 
the penalty should be.13   
Additionally, the sheer knowledge that society punishes a certain action 
goes a long way to achieve the general deterrence sought by utilitarians; 
this is true even when a potential actor does not even believe he is likely 
to be caught.14 
2.  Individual Deterrence   
Individual deterrence differs from general deterrence in two ways: 
(1) the deterrent effect does not present itself until after punishment, 
and (2) the deterrent effect is concentrated solely on punishing the actor 
rather than affecting the wider population.15  Like general deterrence, 
however, the severity of the administered punishment is considered, 
 
 10 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 134 
(1999). 
 11 GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1286. 
 12 Id. (“The person who has already committed a crime cannot, of course, be 
deterred from committing that crime, but his punishment may help deter others.”). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. (“Seeing others punished for certain behavior can create in people a sense of 
association between punishment and act (sic) that may constrain them even when they 
are sure they will not get caught.  Adults, as well as children, may subconsciously fear 
punishment even though rationally they are confident it will not occur.”). 
 15 Id. at 1287 (“Adults are more able than small children to draw conclusions from 
the punishment of others, but having a harm befall oneself is almost always a sharper 
lesson than seeing the same harm occur to others.”). 
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and an increase in severity is required in some cases, such as those 
involving repeat offenders.16 
3.  Norm Reinforcement 
This is not a strong tenet of utilitarian justification for punishment, 
but it is certainly present.  Simply put, when someone is punished for 
doing (or not doing) an act, the punishment reinforces our belief that 
the act is bad and contrary to the normative values that we should 
possess.17  “Serious criminal punishment represents society’s strong 
condemnation of what the offender has done, and performs a significant 
role in moral education.”18 
4.  Incapacitation 
Incapacitation is likely what most people think of when they 
envision criminal punishment.  But utilitarian justifications are not 
solely intended to give the individual what he deserves; rather, the 
incapacitation is implemented to hide the actor away and prevent any 
further physical contact with the public—i.e., public safety via 
separation.19  To note, though, there are two aspects of utilitarian 
incapacitation that stand apart from what is traditionally thought of as 
the retributivist “just-deserts” imprisonment.  Many utilitarians (1)  
emphasize “other forms” of risk management within this umbrella of 
incapacitation, some being probation or parole (with additional 
obligations such as drug testing) and (2) know that incapacitation may 
not always be the answer, especially when the actor is replaced in the 
public under a “next-man-up” type scheme (e.g., the drug dealer’s 
replacement), or when the imprisonment impacts the actor in such a 
way as to make him more dangerous once he is released back into the 
public.20  This last point will be expanded upon shortly, as there are a 
few instances where utilitarians believe the punishment (which, in 
some cases, maybe imprisonment) is not justified. 
 
 16 Id. (“To deter an offender from repeating his actions, a penalty should be severe 
enough to outweigh in his mind the benefits of the crime.  For the utilitarian, more severe 
punishment of repeat offenders is warranted partly because the first penalty has shown 
itself ineffective . . . .”). 
 17 GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1286–87. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 1287. 
 20 Id. 
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5.  Reform 
This specific goal will be heavily emphasized throughout this 
Comment.  The goal of “reform” under the utilitarian framework is to 
make the actor a better person through punishment, which, in turn, will 
make him a healthy and productive member of society.21  Here, the 
actual punishment is geared toward yielding a more productive, healthy 
individual.  As such, the “punishment” takes the form of education or 
vocational training.22  “Thus,” Professor Francis T. Cullen says, “the 
rehabilitative ideal draws its power from its nobility and its 
rationality—from the promise that compassionate science, rather than 
vengeful punishment, is the road to reducing crime.  Rehabilitation 
allows us to be a better and safer people . . . .”23 
6.  Vengeance 
Vengeance is self-explanatory.  It cannot (and should not) be 
overlooked that there is utilitarian value placed upon the overall notion 
of vengeance.  Though this will look similar to the retributivist 
justification of punishment, the true justification (or utilitarian 
argument in support) of vengeance is that it “increase[s] the happiness, 
or reduce[s] the unhappiness, of those who want the offender 
punished.”24  Greenawalt points to two other values that vengeance 
carries within the utilitarian framework: (1) by allowing the victims to 
enact their vengeance through society’s imposition of punishment, it 
increases their respect for the law; and (2) if society enacts punishment 
upon the actor, the associated victims will be satiated, in a sense, and it 
will dissuade them from carrying out their own acts of private self-
help.25  Note, again, these are added layers to the justification that the 
retributivist camp does not deem as necessary. 
7.  Community and Victim Restoration 
Unlike reform, which focuses on the punished actor, this final 
justification of punishment focuses on those affected by that actor.26  
This aim has gained much traction recently under the term “restorative 
 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 299, 310 
(2013). 
 24 GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1287. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 1287–88. 
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justice.”27  Restorative justice entails an overall healing process that 
centers on a level of contriteness exhibited by the actor, which, in turn, 
is accepted by the victim and/or wider community, leading to 
forgiveness and repair.28  While some of the aforementioned means can 
be tied together with the aim of restoration, Greenawalt points out one 
specific aim that is replaced or quieted by restoration: vengeance.29 
C.  Instances in Which Punishment Cannot Be Justified from a 
Utilitarian Perspective 
Keeping in mind the overarching “net societal good” proposition 
upon which utilitarian justification for punishment sits, scholars have 
identified four hurdles that a punishment must overcome before it can 
enter into the club of justified punishments under utilitarian 
principles.30  Jeremy Bentham articulates these hurdles, and, in doing so, 
he frames them within the context of mischief.  “[M]ischief,” according 
to Bentham, is not necessarily solely confined to the virtually innocuous 
acts committed by children on October 30th; rather, “mischief” is any 
act that subtracts from societal happiness.31  Further, Bentham points 
out that the wrongful act that brings about the punishment—as well as 
the punishment itself—detract from societal happiness; thus, both the 
punishment and the punished act are, in this regard, mischief.32  To 
frame the mischief analysis, therefore, within the “net societal good” 
goal of utilitarian justification, the implementation of punishment must 
not leave the overall balance of mischief higher than it would have been 
if no punishment had been implemented at all.33  Thus, the four hurdles 
that would immediately fail the mischief analysis arise when the 
punishment is (1) groundless, (2) inefficacious, (3) unprofitable, or (4) 
needless.34 
Under the first hurdle, punishment is groundless (and, thus, not 
justifiable) when no mischief has occurred.35  The most common 
example of this (it may be the sole example, as it was the only one 
Bentham articulated) is consent:  if there was consent for the actor to 
 
 27 Id. at 1288. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. (“Restorative measures can also be seen as a means of deflecting the desires of 
victims and the public for vengeance, and providing a more constructive outlet for such 
feelings.”). 
 30 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 134. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 134–38. 
 35 Id. at 134. 
SHUBECK (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:27 PM 
546 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:539 
conduct his “wrongful” act, then he has committed no wrong, and there 
is nothing to punish (no “mischief”).36   
Any risk regarding the second hurdle is usually cleared so long as 
(1) the violated law in question actually applied to the actor, and (2) the 
actor actually violated the law.37  In reality, the only times this hurdle 
cannot be met will be when issues are triggered related to (1) ex post 
facto laws; (2) lack of proper notice; (3) an inability to form the requisite 
mens rea (infancy, intoxication, insanity); (4) additional shortcomings 
regarding the mens rea (mistake or lack of intent); (5) external 
influences implicating duress, self-defense, or necessity; and (6) an 
inability to satisfy the actus reus of the offense (lack of voluntary 
action).38 
The “unprofitable” hurdle cannot be met if the imposition of any 
punishment in response to the proscribed act can never result in the net 
societal good.39  This specific hurdle (like the prior two) will not play 
much of a role in this Comment. 
Unfortunately, there is not much discussion about the “needless” 
hurdle, but it is likely to be triggered when analyzing NERA’s fit in the 
current New Jersey criminal justice system.  In short, Bentham says that 
the punishment in question will be needless (and thus not justifiable) 
“[w]here the purpose of putting an end to the practice may be attained 
as effectually at a cheaper rate.”40  This reinforces the notion of the net 
societal good and adds a layer of efficiency: not only do we want to 
achieve that net societal good through our punishment but we also want 
to maximize that net good. 
It is important to always remember that the utilitarian scheme is 
focused on achieving the greater good end via the punishment mean.41  
Consequently, much of the aims of utilitarian punishment (restoration, 
reformation, etc.), while applicable to wide swaths of the population, 
lead to an individualization of the assessment regarding what (and how 
much) punishment to implement.42  This leads to “long confinement for 
 
 36 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 134–35. 
 37 See id. at 135–37. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 137–38. 
 40 Id. at 138. 
 41 GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 1288.  (“[T]he acts for which criminal punishment 
should be authorized are those with respect to which the good consequences of 
punishment can outweigh the bad; the persons who should be punished are those whom 
it is useful to punish; and the severity of punishment should be determined not by some 
abstract notion of deserts but by marginal usefulness.”). 
 42 Id. 
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those judged irredeemably antisocial, and to rehabilitation and prompt 
release for those whose character can be positively transformed.”43 
D.  Retributivism 
1.  Brief History of Retributivism’s Return to Prominence 
Though retributivism’s popularity and public acceptance have 
fluctuated over the recent decades, its return to prominence in the mid-
to-late 1970s is of particular interest to this discussion because its rise 
came coupled with a sharp decline in the acceptance of rehabilitative 
(utilitarian) goals.44  According to Cullen’s research, this decline in the 
belief of rehabilitation was facilitated by (1) an overall distrust in the 
system to be able to rehabilitate offenders, and (2) negative public 
feelings associated with the concept of rehabilitating rather than 
punishing offenders.45  Regarding distrust in the system, Cullen points 
to three sub-issues, two of which deserve special note: (1) the adequacy 
of the prison environment to facilitate rehabilitation, and (2) the 
ulterior motives of those in charge of “rehabilitation.”46  
Cullen points to intrinsic shortcomings of the prison system as one 
reason for its perceived inadequacy.47  Additionally, prison-based 
emergencies in America during this time—such as the Attica riots of 
1971—painted the system as something that did not even resemble one 
associated with “corrections.”48  To make matters worse for those who 
championed rehabilitation, the Stanford Prison Experiment49 seemed to 
illustrate not only the lack of rehabilitative qualities of prison but also 
the negative transformative qualities of it.50  On the ulterior motive 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Cullen, supra note 23, at 314 (“By the mid-1970s, it had become common to 
ask, ‘Is rehabilitation dead?’”). 
 45 Id. at 314–18, 324–25. 
 46 Id. at 317–19. 
 47 Id. at 317 (“Custodial goals [in prisons]—the need to maintain order and to 
prevent escapes—would always trump the therapeutic.  Those in charge might give lip 
service to rehabilitation, but their jobs hinged on keeping prisons quiet, not curing 
offenders.”). 
 48 Id. 
 49 The Stanford Prison Experiment was a psychological study conducted in 1973.  
What started as a seemingly innocuous study of the power dynamic between the student 
guards and prisoners turned abusive and raised significant ethical concerns about the 
propriety of the entire study.  For more information on the Stanford Prison Experiment, 
see Saul McLeod, The Stanford Prison Experiment, SIMPLY PSYCHOL. (last updated 2020), 
https://www.simplypsychology.org/zimbardo.html. 
 50 Cullen, supra note 23, at 317–18 (quoting Philip G. Zimbardo et al., A Pirandellian 
Prison: The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 8, 1973, at 56) (“If this could 
happen in so short a time, . . . and if it could happen to the ‘cream-of-the-crop of 
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point, Cullen points to a “mirage” of the system: there was no well-oiled 
machine where judges methodically assessed risk factors and prison 
officials systematically and carefully guided the offender through the 
process; instead, malicious, racially prejudicial actions were taken by 
those in power, and rehabilitation was but a false flag.51 
The public’s negative perception of rehabilitation played a major 
role in its decline, and that perception stemmed, in part, from public 
sentiments regarding other supposedly “weak” links in society, such as 
(1) single mothers (disrespectfully labeled as “welfare queens”52) being 
able to receive benefits without having to join the workforce;53 (2) a 
distancing from physical punishment in the schools plus a shift away 
from traditional teaching curriculum;54 and (3) a lack of serious 
punishment of young offenders.55  These societal judgments led people 
to believe that rehabilitation was weak on crime: “Judges were placing 
dangerous predators not in prison but back on the streets, and 
kindhearted or duped parole boards were being conned into releasing 
career criminals prematurely.”56  Thus, the shift toward desert-based 
punishment that was tough on crime swung back in favor of 
retributivism. 
2.  Retributivist Justifications for Punishment 
As noted earlier, one of the main retributivist justifications for 
punishment concerns only the culpability of the actor.  To quote 
commentator Michael S. Moore, “[t]he distinctive aspect of retributivism 
is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish 
him or her; the principle [that only those who are guilty should be 
punished] make[s] such moral desert only a necessary condition of 
punishment.”57  Regarding the prospect of these greater goods or 
additional goals of punishment, Moore says that many retributivists 
“ha[ve] no room” for them.58  “That future crime might also be prevented 
by punishment is a happy surplus for a retributivist, but no part of the 
 
American youth,’ then one can only shudder to imagine what society is doing both to the 
actual guards and prisoners who are [in the real prison system].”). 
 51 Id. at 318. 
 52 Id. at 324. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Cullen, supra note 23, at 324. 
 57 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND 
THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 180 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); 
DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 9, at 42. 
 58 Moore, supra note 57, at 180–81.  
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justification for punishing.”59  To cement the notion that the actor’s 
culpability and blameworthiness is justification in and of itself, Moore 
explains that such blameworthiness does not merely justify the 
imposition of punishment; rather, it impresses upon society the duty to 
impose punishment.60 
Though they do not expressly do away with the traditional 
justification for punishment, Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton view 
the retributivist justification for punishment from a different 
perspective: bringing balance back to society.61  Murphy and Hampton 
classify illegal wrongdoing as causing a victim to suffer, thus taking 
something from that victim.62  The commentators note that “if [the 
victim] cause[s] the wrongdoer to suffer in proportion to [the victim’s] 
suffering at [the wrongdoer’s] hands, [the wrongdoer’s] elevation over 
[the victim] is denied, and moral reality is reaffirmed.”63  At first glance, 
this may seem to be utilitarian in nature: the punishment is proportional 
to the suffering, and it is implemented to bring about balance, which 
may be argued as a net good.  This notion is quickly dispatched, 
however, as Hampton firmly notes: 
[E]ven in a situation where neither the wrongdoer nor society 
will either listen to or believe the message about the victim’s 
worth which the “punitive defeat” is meant to carry, and 
where the victim doesn’t need to hear (or will not believe) that 
message in order to allay any personal fears of diminishment, 
the retributivist will insist on the infliction of punishment 
insofar as it is a way of “striking a blow for morality” or (to use 
a phrase of C.S. Lewis’s) a way to “plant the flag” of morality.64 
Thus, it does not matter whether the victim will feel restored—
retributivist justifications demand punishment in the face of the wrong, 
and that, alone, is sufficient. 
III.  NEW JERSEY PAROLE AND EXPUNGEMENT: A DASH OF RETRIBUTIVISM TO 
THE UTILITARIAN MEAL 
No sources found during the research for this Comment argue that 
an effective criminal justice system can only embody or implement one 
justification for punishment.  Thus, systems that form a hybrid of both 
 
 59 Id. at 180. 
 60 Id. at 182. 
 61 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 124–28, 130 (1988); see 
also DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 9, at 49–50. 
 62 MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 61, at 128–30. 
 63 Id. at 125. 
 64 Id. at 130. 
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retributivist and utilitarian justifications could maintain a safe and 
healthy society.  This Part illustrates the hybrid nature of two key 
aspects of the New Jersey criminal system (parole and expungement), 
showing that a fair balance of retributivist and utilitarian purposes 
allows for both just punishment and meaningful rehabilitation. 
A.  Parole 
Parole’s hybrid nature can be seen in a few different ways.  For 
instance, determining whether an individual is entitled to parole turns, 
in part, on his rehabilitation while incarcerated—an inquiry that has a 
fairly distinct utilitarian flavor.65  On the other hand, we see a dash of 
retributivist principles at play in certain facets of parole, such as the fact 
that an individual is not eligible for parole until a certain point in his 
incarceration.  This Section will evaluate the overarching hybrid nature 
of parole by examining three statutory provisions in New Jersey: (1) 
Eligibility;66 (2) Supervision for Life;67 and (3) Victim Input.68 
1.  Parole Eligibility 
Whether an individual is granted parole turns on a set of primarily 
utilitarian-geared factors.  Whether (and when) the individual is eligible 
to seek parole at all, however, is a horse of a different color; indeed, it 
seems to be part of the dash of retributivism that gives parole its hybrid 
flavor.  For example, under the parole eligibility provision, if an 
individual is sentenced to life imprisonment without any mandatory 
minimum sentence, he is eligible for parole after serving 25 years.69  
Alternatively, if an individual is sentenced to a non-life term without any 
mandatory minimum sentence, he is eligible for parole after serving 
one-third of the imposed sentence.70  A 2002 informational article titled 
“A Brief Overview of the Parole Process in New Jersey” outlines the 
many utilitarian factors taken into account by the Parole Board when 
determining whether an individual is eligible for parole.71  Employing 
what appears to be utilitarian-geared considerations, the Parole Board 
weighs factors, such as (1) the actor’s participation in programs while 
incarcerated, which show “improvement of problems diagnosed at 
 
 65 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.52 (2020). 
 66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.51 (2020). 
 67 § 30:4-123.51b; § 2C:43-6.4. 
 68 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:71-3.48 (2020). 
 69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.51(b) (2020). 
 70 Id. § 30:4-123.51(a). 
 71 New Jersey State Parole Board, A Brief Overview of the Parole Process in New Jersey 
7 (Feb. 2002), https://www.nj.gov/parole/docs/ParoleProcess.pdf. 
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admission or during incarceration”;72 (2) the actor’s employment 
history and/or education;73 (3) the actor’s family history and current 
familial relationships;74 and (4) proof of the actor’s change (for better or 
worse) in his attitude toward others (or even himself).75  This 
retributivism-first-utilitarian-second approach allows for culpability to 
be assessed on the front end of punishment (in determining how long 
an individual must be incarcerated before becoming eligible for parole), 
with rehabilitation and reformation picking up the baton after 
sentencing.  This approach appears to incorporate the retributivist 
principle that those who do wrong should be punished, without 
sacrificing the ever-growing understanding that individuals can change 
and redeem themselves to at least become law-abiding members of 
society. 
2.  Supervision for Life 
Though New Jersey’s Supervision for Life provision is relatively 
simple, it does impose lifetime parole supervision in certain cases.76  The 
provision illustrates that a hybrid of retributivist and utilitarian goals 
can still be achieved without being “weak” on crime.  Here, the New 
Jersey legislature determined that lifetime supervision is mandatory in 
some instances, a consequence that depends on the type of crime of 
which an individual has been convicted.77  This seemingly culpability-
based (read: retributivist) approach is contrasted with a different 
provision regarding lifetime supervision that pulls on utilitarian 
principles: 
A court imposing sentence on a person who has been 
convicted of endangering the welfare of a child . . . or an 
attempt to commit either of these offenses shall include . . . a 
special sentence of parole supervision for life . . . unless the 
court finds on the record that the special sentence is not needed 
to protect the community or deter the defendant from future 
criminal activity.78 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.4(a) (2020). 
 77 Id. (“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a judge imposing 
sentence on a person who has been convicted of aggravated sexual assault, sexual 
assault . . . or an attempt to commit any of these offenses shall include . . . a special 
sentence of parole supervision for life.”) (emphasis added). 
 78 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Under a purely retributivist approach, community protection and 
deterrence are merely a “happy surplus,” rather than an express 
consideration.79  Thus, since the above-quoted passage of the lifetime 
supervision section expressly takes those utilitarian considerations into 
account, the hybrid nature of New Jersey’s parole system is reinforced. 
3.  Victim Input 
One specific piece of parole legislation pertains to the ability of a 
victim (or nearest relative of the victim in cases of manslaughter or 
murder) to speak to the impact of the actor’s crime.  Depending on the 
circumstances of the parole hearing, the victim’s statements may be 
written or videotaped.80  The victim’s statements may include “(1) [t]he 
continuing nature and extent of any physical, psychological or emotional 
harm or trauma suffered; (2) [t]he extent of any loss of earnings or 
ability to work suffered by the victim; and (3) [t]he continuing effect of 
the crime upon the victim’s family.”81  This provision is another example 
of the blending of retributivist and utilitarian principles in the New 
Jersey parole system.  On the retributivist side, victim input seems to 
speak directly to the actor’s continuing culpability or blameworthiness.  
At the same time, however, one can view victim input as triggering the 
sixth aim of punishment under the utilitarian framework—vengeance—
by allowing victims or their relatives to have their day in court.  They 
can feel like they have had a tangible impact on keeping the actor 
incarcerated, as their input is considered in determining parole 
eligibility.  As noted earlier, this can help dissuade any desire to engage 
in self-help.  Thus, victim input continues to reinforce the hybrid nature 
of parole in New Jersey. 
4.  Case Law Discussing the Hybrid Nature of Parole 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey expounded upon the principles 
and goals behind parole in State v. Black.82 There, the Black court 
pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s characterization of parole, 
noting that its purpose is “to help individuals reintegrate into society as 
constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined 
for the full term of the sentence imposed.”83  The Black court noted that 
parole is “clearly” rehabilitative rather than punitive, and the court even 
pointed to the fact that the current parole scheme in New Jersey calls for 
 
 79 Moore, supra note 57, at 180. 
 80 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:71-3.48(a) (2020). 
 81 § 10A:71-3.48(f). 
 82 State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438, 447–51 (1998). 
 83 Id. at 447 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)). 
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a presumption in favor of parole and a belief that the punitive aspects of 
the sentence are complete once eligibility is triggered.84  This shows the 
hybrid nature of parole in action, reinforcing the aforementioned 
retributivism-first-utilitarian-second approach. 
Following its discussion of the system’s overarching purposes, the 
Black court turned to specific aspects of parole, noting that they, too, are 
consistent with the rehabilitative (utilitarian) goal of parole.  When 
discussing parole restrictions, the court again pointed to the United 
States Supreme Court’s commentary that restrictions, such as 
mandatory reporting to parole officers, “are part of the administrative 
system designed to assist parolees and offer them guidance.”85  The 
Black court concluded that “the restrictions placed on parolees are . . . 
rehabilitative rather than punitive in purpose.”86 
Within the context of parole revocation (a mechanism that seems 
punitive and retributivist), the Black court determined that 
notwithstanding an accompanying deterrent component, parole 
revocation still sits within the overarching rehabilitative purpose of 
parole.87  The Black court continued to rely upon the Morrissey court’s 
characterizations and quoted its interpretation of the process behind 
revoking parole.88 
One final parole condition illustrates the blend of retributivist and 
utilitarian principles within the New Jersey parole system:  restitution 
and reparations.  At first glance, this may appear to exhibit solely 
retributivist qualities.  How else could the prospect of having to lose 
money and/or property as a result of your wrongful actions be 
categorized as anything other than a retributive measure akin to an “eye 
for an eye?”  For the Trantino89 court, showing the hybrid nature of this 
condition was easy: restitution and reparations assure “rehabilitation of 
the offender and . . . prevent the recurrence of future criminal 
conduct.”90  Remember, these explicit goals noted by the Trantino court 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 448. 
 88 Black, 153 N.J. at 447–51 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479–80) (“The first step 
in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual decision: whether 
the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of his parole.  Only if 
it is determined that the parolee did violate the conditions does the second question 
arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to 
protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation? . . . The second question involves 
the application of expertise by the parole authority in making a prediction as to the 
ability of the individual to live in society without committing antisocial acts.”). 
 89 In re Trantino, 446 A.2d 104 (N.J. 1982). 
 90 Id. at 111. 
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are simply a “happy surplus” to many retributivists (thus, this implicates 
both retributivist and utilitarian principles).91  The Trantino court 
conducted a lengthy analysis of the goals behind restitution within the 
context of a parole condition, and it interpreted this measure as a tool 
to ensure the inmate realizes “the enormity of his conduct” and 
“disgorge[s] the fruits of his offense” to restore those fruits to the 
victim.92  The Trantino court even determined that requiring restitution 
to the victim’s family members in the case of homicide does not run 
afoul of the rehabilitative goal to be achieved.93  Finally, the Trantino 
court expressly advocated for a careful calculation of the specific 
amount of restitution to be ordered to preserve this hybrid scheme.94 
B.  Expungement 
Expungement’s effect in New Jersey is simple: with only minor 
exceptions, once an individual’s record is expunged, he can proceed with 
his life as if his arrest/conviction did not happen, effectively 
extinguishing a large aspect of the collateral consequences associated 
with that initial arrest/conviction.95  Of all three facets of New Jersey 
criminal laws discussed in this Comment, expungement appears to have 
the least amount of retributivism in its recipe.  According to the relevant 
statutory provisions, and as interpreted in the foundational case of In re 
LoBasso,96 once a petitioner can show the mechanical aspects of the 
petition are satisfied (such as a clear record for the prior decade (or five 
years, if the petitioner falls within a certain statutory provision that is 
not pertinent to this Comment)), a presumption in favor of 
expungement arises.97  This is not a static presumption, however; after 
the initial presumption takes effect, the burden shifts to the state, which 
is tasked with satisfying the reviewing court that the “‘need for the 
availability of records’ outweighs the ‘desirability of having a person 
freed from any disabilities’ associated with the conviction record.”98  
The LoBasso court noted the policy behind expungement in New Jersey 
 
 91 Moore, supra note 57, at 180. 
 92 Trantino, 446 A.2d at 109. 
 93 Id. at 110 (“If a crime causes injury not only to the immediate victim but also to 
others, as is the case with a homicide, there is no reason why payment to suffering third 
persons will not make the offender appreciate the loss which he has caused as greatly 
as payment to the victim would.”). 
 94 Id. at 111 (“If restitution or reparation is not honed closely to the contours of 
rehabilitation, there is a danger that it will become nothing more than a weapon for 
retribution, rather than a useful tool for personal progress and socialization.”). 
 95 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-27 (2020). 
 96 In re LoBasso, 33 A.3d 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
 97 Id. at 547–48. 
 98 Id. at 548 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-14(b) (2020)). 
SHUBECK (DO NOT DELETE) 11/5/2020  10:27 PM 
2020] COMMENT 555 
as focusing on not only enhancing the enforcement of New Jersey 
criminal laws but also on aspects of crime prevention, reentry of 
offenders into society, and promoting employability of former 
offenders.99  The express reference to rectitude and disassociation from 
unlawful activity in the expungement statutes themselves also lends 
credence to the notion that expungement in New Jersey places a heavier 
emphasis on utilitarian rather than retributivist objectives.100 
To effectuate this policy, the LoBasso court developed a multi-
factor analysis that all reviewing courts should employ when faced with 
a decision as to whether expungement is outweighed by the public 
interest in retaining records.101  Overall, the reviewing court must 
consider the “conduct and character” of the petitioner, as well as the 
“nature of the offense” for which he was incarcerated.102 
In analyzing the conduct and character, the court may consider 
whether the petitioner has engaged in activities that have reduced the 
risk that he will re-offend, or, on the other hand, whether the petitioner 
has avoided engaging in activities that would increase the risk of re-
offending.103 This consideration can include four sub-considerations: 
(1) the employment and/or educational status of the petitioner (job 
training or other education);104 (2) the petitioner’s compliance with 
legal obligations other than the ones directly related to expungement, 
such as child support, alimony, and parking tickets;105 (3) whether the 
petitioner has maintained community ties or strong familial ties that 
promote law-abiding tendencies;106 and (4) whether the petitioner has 





 99 Id. at 549 (citing GOV. JON S. CORZINE, A STRATEGY FOR SAFE STREETS AND NEIGHBORHOODS, 
EXECUTIVE Summary 24 (2007)).) 
 100 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-32 (2020) (noting that expungement “shall be 
construed with the primary objective of providing relief to the reformed offender who 
has led a life of rectitude and disassociated himself with unlawful activity, but not to 
create a system whereby persistent violators of the law or those who associate 
themselves with continuing criminal activity have a regular means of expunging their 
police and criminal records”). 
 101 In re LoBasso, 33 A.3d at 491–95. 
 102 Id. at 491–93. 
 103 Id. at 550. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 In re LoBasso, 33 A.3d at 550. 
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The petitioner’s conduct while incarcerated or released on parole 
or probation will certainly factor into the decision-making process for 
expungement.108  Interestingly, but in line with ensuring that the 
petitioner truly has rehabilitated himself and demonstrated a new path 
in life, a court “may consider facts related to an arrest that did not lead 
to a conviction” in between the incident to be potentially expunged and 
the time of the expungement petition “if supported by cognizable 
evidence, and the court makes an appropriate finding, after a hearing if 
necessary.”109  It should be noted that this specifies arrests that did not 
lead to a conviction because, in the case of expungement, a subsequent 
conviction would bar the petitioner’s ability to expunge his record, as 
the clean record is one of the mechanical requirements before the 
balancing test can be reached. 
Yet retributivist flavors are not wholly absent from expungement.  
While reviewing the circumstances surrounding the “nature of the 
offense,” the court may weigh facts “surrounding the grade and 
definition of the offense, and the facts relating directly to the elements 
of the offense.”110  This part of the inquiry can also include 
circumstances surrounding the offense, such as the petitioner’s age at 
the time of the offense or the presence of any “overbearing cohort.”111  
Thus, it appears that facts relating to blameworthiness and culpability 
do make it into the pot.   
As mentioned above, however, the hybrid nature of expungement 
skews closer to the utilitarian end.  This is illustrated in LoBasso, as the 
court reinforced that the focus is on rehabilitation, noting that even 
when reviewing the circumstances of the underlying conviction, a court 
may consider “cognizable evidence that the conviction record actually 
has impeded the petitioner’s efforts to resume a productive, law-abiding 
life.”112 
 
 108 Id. (“Exemplary performance on probation and early discharge would be a 
positive factor.  On the other hand, a record of probation violations, or an extension of 
probation, would not.”). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 551 (“Thus, the nature of an eluding offense might include that a petitioner 
drove at high speed or over a great distance to flee an officer, and the nature of risks 
presented.  The nature of an assault case might include the age of the victim.”). 
 111 Id. at 551–52. 
 112 Id. at 552. 
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IV.  NERA: ADDING TOO MUCH RETRIBUTIVIST HEAT TO THE DISH 
NERA113 is a straightforward, mechanical piece of criminal 
legislation.  Simply put, NERA mandates that “[a] court imposing a 
sentence of incarceration for a crime of the first or second degree 
enumerated in subsection d. of this section shall fix a minimum term of 
85% of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall not be 
eligible for parole.”114  The offenses which fall within the purview of 
NERA include: (1) murder;115 (2) Aggravated manslaughter or 
manslaughter;116 (3) vehicular homicide;117 (4) aggravated assault;118 
(5) disarming a law enforcement officer;119 (6) kidnapping;120 (7) 
aggravated sexual assault;121 (8) sexual assault;122 (9) robbery;123 (10) 
carjacking;124 (11) aggravated arson;125 (12) burglary;126 (13) 
extortion;127 (14) “[b]ooby traps in manufacturing or distribution 
facilities”;128 (15) drug-induced deaths that carry strict liability;129 (16) 
terrorism;130 (17) “[p]roducing or possessing chemical weapons, 
biological agents or nuclear or radiological devices”;131 (18) first-degree 
racketeering;132 (19) firearms trafficking;133 and (20) “causing or 
permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act, knowing that the 
act may be reproduced or reconstructed in any manner, or be part of an 
exhibition or performance.”134 
 
 113 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2 (2020) 
 114 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(a). 
 115 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(1). 
 116 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(2). 
 117 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(3). 
 118 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(4). 
 119 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(5) (2020). 
 120 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(6). 
 121 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(7). 
 122 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(8). 
 123 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(9). 
 124 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(10). 
 125 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(11) (2020). 
 126 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(12). 
 127 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(13). 
 128 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(14). 
 129 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(15). 
 130 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(16). 
 131 N.J. STAT. ANN.  § 2C:43-7.2(d)(17) (2020). 
 132 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(18). 
 133 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(19). 
 134 Id. § 2C:43-7.2(d)(20). 
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Supreme Court of New Jersey has admitted that legislative history 
regarding NERA is “scant,” but the court has expressed that it is clear 
that “the purpose of the Act was to ‘increase prison time for offenders 
committing the most serious crimes in society.’”135  Indeed, the 
Appellate Division has noted that punishment is the focus of the 
legislative policy behind NERA.136  This purpose, when compared to 
parole and expungement, should not sit right with the utilitarian.  There 
is no balancing to be done, nor are there considerations of rehabilitation 
or the possibility that the actor could be restored to a meaningful 
contributor to society.  It is true, however, that the acts that trigger the 
application of NERA are certainly those that society deems to be the 
most heinous. 
Based upon NERA’s mainly retributivist makeup, one may question 
how it fits within the utilitarian framework.  If one attempts to justify 
NERA on utilitarian grounds, one may point to deterrence (both general 
and specific), but they would likely fall short.  In fact, pointing to any of 
the utilitarian justifications likely raises a problem, due to one 
potentially fatal shortcoming—the four hurdles.137  Specifically, the final 
hurdle—utilitarian justifications—will not be satisfied when the 
implementation of the punishment is needless and can be implemented 
at a cheaper rate.138   
It may be helpful to analyze this problem in dollars, and some slight 
extrapolation will be in order.  According to a 2018 survey of Atlantic 
County jails, the average per-inmate/per-year incarceration cost was 
$29,674.139  Recent statewide figures are not available, but using this 
figure as the number across all New Jersey counties and multiplying it 
by the previously mentioned figure of 19,212 incarcerated individuals 
in New Jersey yields an estimated cost of $570 million statewide.  
Considering that roughly 76% of incarcerated individuals in the New 
Jersey prison system are serving mandatory minimum sentences140 
(such as NERA), we can break this $570 million down to show that the 
(very rough) estimated cost of mandatory minimum programs in New 
Jersey is $433 million.  Though the above-mentioned Atlantic County 
 
 135 State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 569 (2001) (citing The S. Law and Pub. Safety 
Comm., Statement to S. B. No. 855 (N.J. 1996)). 
 136 State v. Jules, 784 A.2d 722, 725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 137 See supra notes 30–40 and accompanying text. 
 138 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 137–38. 
 139 Molly Bilinski, Cost of Incarceration: South Jersey Jails by the Numbers, THE PRESS OF 
ATLANTIC CITY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/cost-of-
incarceration-south-jersey-jails-by-the-numbers/article_7ca40896-d67f-5b2f-9a06-
a75e654aa2dc.html. 
 140 Offender Statistics, supra note 2. 
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survey was conducted in 2012 and noted that some data points could 
not be calculated at the time, a comparison between the economic costs 
of restorative justice (which, as noted above, serves utilitarian goals) 
and the traditional system yielded a finding that restorative justice is a 
more cost-efficient approach to punishment.141  If one subscribes to the 
utilitarian principle stated above that a less costly avenue automatically 
renders a given punishment unjustifiable, graduate student Jillian M. 
Furman’s study seems to point in a direction that would render 
traditional mandatory minimum sentences (like NERA) potentially 
unjustifiable.142 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the negative impact of NERA’s 
heavy retributivist presence is to show how NERA frustrates the hybrid 
objectives of other legislation, namely parole.  The Appellate Division 
dealt with this issue in State v. Webster.143  There, the court addressed 
the fact that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by NERA 
impacts an incarcerated individual’s ability to accumulate “front end” 
work credits to lessen his sentence and be up for parole early: 
The Parole Board interprets NERA to preclude the application 
of commutation and work credits to the “front end” of a 
sentence subject to NERA so as to lessen the period of parole 
ineligibility, and instead recognizes those credits as applicable 
only to the remaining base term or “back end” of a sentence.  
As the result of the operation of statutory sentence 
maximums, which effectively require a period of custody that 
is less than the custodial term stated by the sentencing court, 
the credits thus become of little or no substantive use to an 
inmate, since the end of the period of parole ineligibility 
imposed under NERA will usually be coterminous with the 
maximum sentence pursuant to statute.144 
This effectively means that an individual’s ability to reform himself 
and accrue work credits while incarcerated ends up having no impact 
on his overall sentence.  In a world where incentives often bring about 
action, this scheme acts as an empty offer, forcing inmates to serve as 
much of a sentence as they would have had they accrued no work 
 
 141 Jillian M. Furman, An Economic Analysis of Restorative Justice, THE UNIV. OF MASS. 
BOSTON 1, 67, 73 (Aug. 2012) (determining that restorative justice, from an economic 
perspective, is “nearly six times more cost-effective that traditional criminal justice 
methods”). 
 142 The utility of the Cape May example may not be very strong.  The author of this 
Comment does not purport to be a statistics expert, and he recognizes the shortcomings 
of using one county’s prison statistics in estimating the cost of a prison system for an 
entire state. 
 143 State v. Webster, 892 A.2d 688 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
 144 Id. at 689 (emphasis added). 
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credits.  This may not discourage rehabilitation and reformation, but it 
certainly does not encourage it, effectively leaving the utilitarian side of 
the hybrid system with one arm tied behind its back. 
Finally, if searching for examples of the effects of a heavily 
retributivist-leaning system, one could point to California in the late 
1970s.145  As Cullen chronicled in his discussion, California had, at one 
time, been a shining example of an effective prison system—one in 
which rehabilitation was a focus.146  Unfortunately, as the societal 
climate shifted toward hating criminals and perceiving rehabilitation as 
a weakness, the political process forced officials to drastically swing the 
California prison system in the opposite direction, even going so far as 
to declare the goal of its system as one of “punishment and not 
rehabilitation.”147  The result, according to Cullen, was a system that was 
“‘increasingly stark, depressing, and punitive,’ with offenders having 
‘few genuine opportunities to change their lives.’”148  The key point to 
take away here is not that the system was bad (which, according to 
Cullen and Page, it was), but that once decisionmakers within the state 
decided to turn toward a more balanced, hybrid system, it proved to be 
a “daunting challenge.”149  Indeed, as Cullen notes, when a state turns 
away from rehabilitation and opens the door for all things punitive and 
retributivist, it lets in things that damage a system that values 
rehabilitation rather than aid it.150  
V.  A MORE BALANCED DIET 
The level of insight, knowledge, and overall skill to effectively 
isolate and implement changes to NERA far surpass what the author of 
this Comment possesses.  But the overarching conclusion remains: 
should NERA remain in its current form, its heavy retributivist 
framework puts the efficacy of New Jersey’s hybrid scheme in jeopardy.  
To visualize the author’s suggested split between NERA’s framework 
and the framework of the other discussed aspects of New Jersey 
criminal law, see the following diagram: 
 
 
 145 Cullen, supra note 23, at 332. 
 146 Id. at 331–32.  
 147 Id. at 332.  
 148 Id. (quoting JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON 
OFFICERS IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2011)). 
 149 Id. (citing PAGE, supra note 148). 
 150 Cullen, supra note 23, at 333 (“[T]he abandonment of rehabilitation created space 
for the spread of new forms of . . . punitive interventions that, if anything, increased 
recidivism. . . . Their utter ineffectiveness not only wasted untold millions of dollars but 
also needlessly endangered public safety.”). 
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If searching for any scintilla of evidence that this suggested split is 
detrimental and potentially in need of reassessment, the reader need 
look no further than an official report published by the New Jersey 
Criminal Sentencing & Disposition Commission (“the Commission”) in 
November of 2019.151  The Commission noted two principles on which 
its findings stood: (1) “individuals convicted of crimes should spend no 
more time in prison than is necessary to achieve the purposes of 
sentencing”;152 and (2) “to the extent individuals must spend time in 
prison, that time should be used as productively as possible to 
encourage rehabilitation and prepare for their return to society.”153  If 
this Comment has done even part of its job, the readers should have bells 
and whistles going off, alerting them to the fact that the Commission’s 
first principle seems to skew toward the retributivist end of the 
spectrum, while the second principle skews toward the utilitarian end.  
Thus, it appears that the Commission desires to bring NERA closer to 
the hybrid structure of other aspects of the New Jersey criminal system.   
The Commission makes various recommendations in its report, but 
its third touches directly on NERA: the Commission recommends that 
the mandatory sentence for second-degree robbery and burglary should 
be reduced from 85% to 50%.154  The Commission based its decision, in 
part, on the fact that those offenses (1) often result in no physical injury 
and (2) are charged with a relatively high frequency.155  The Commission 
also noted economic savings associated with these changes.156  The 
Commission did not quantify the savings, and this Comment does not 
attempt to do so.157  But the Commission did conclude that the savings 
can be reinvested back into the system, ideally to be used to identify 
strategic areas in which public safety can be increased.158  The 
 
 151 N.J. CRIMINAL SENTENCING & DISPOSITION COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT (2019) [hereinafter 
COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 152 Id. at 2. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 23–24. 
 155 Id. at 24. 
 156 Id. at 33. 
 157 This Comment has already engaged in enough speculative statistics in Part IV. 
 158 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 151, at 33. 
Retributivist Purposes Utilitarian Purposes 
Expungement NERA Parole 
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Commission’s report was just one small step in the direction of bringing 
NERA toward a more hybrid status, but achieving a balanced diet takes 
time. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
New Jersey lawmakers should view the current version of NERA 
through the lens of punishment theory.  By placing more emphasis on 
the hybrid scheme that our current system seems to embody, potential 
future NERA alterations could bring this piece of legislation more in line 
with the other discussed aspects of the New Jersey criminal system.  Not 
only would this approach make our state criminal justice system more 
consistent, but it could also lead to an overall healthier society.  This 
most certainly does not advocate for an outright repeal of NERA or an 
approach that rewards the type of offenders that would normally fall 
within the purview of NERA; rather, it aims to make sure those 
individuals are held accountable with an appropriate level of force while 
making sure they are given the opportunity to reform themselves and 
benefit society. 
 
